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The 1985 Civil Rule Amendments
by Robert M. Hardaway
Effective January 1, 1985, significant
amendments were made to several of
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
("C.R.C.P."). The most important amendments were to C.R.C.P. Rules 59 (posttrial) motions) and 103 (garnishment).'
However, there were also significant
amendments to C.R.C.P. Rules 58 (entry of judgment), 52 (findings by the
court), 50 (motion for directed verdict),
and 6 (time), as well as Colorado Appellate Rules ("C.A.R.") Rule 4 (appeals).
Changes in C.R.C.P. Rude 59
C.R.C.P. Rule 59, which previously
covered only motions for new trial, now
covers all post-trial motions. The apparent purpose of the new rule is to streamline the post-trial process by setting forth,
in one comprehensive rule, standards
and grounds for all post-trial motions. An
additional purpose of the new rule is to
eliminate certain pitfalls and traps which
have plagued the Colorado litigator in
recent years. Thus, motions forjudgment
N.O.V., new trial and to amend findings
and judgment are now all covered by new
Rule 59.
The new Colorado rule represents a
substantial departure from the old rule
which closely tracked the federal version.
Indeed, it is more accurate to describe the
Rule 59 changes as repeal and reenactment rather than amendment. As a
result, the federal rule has been diminished as a useful counterpoint and as a
source of persuasive authority in interpreting the Colorado rule. Due to these
extensive changes, it may be some time
before the impact of the rule can be measured.

In particular, re-enacted Rule 59 differs from its predecessor in the following
critical respects:
1) A motion for new trial is not a prerequisite to appellate review;
2) Issues on appeal are not limited to
issues raised in a motion for new
trial;
3) A motion for directed verdict at the
end of all the evidence is not a prerequisite to a motion for judgment
N.O.V.
4) Insufficiency of the evidence is a
ground for judgment N.O.V. but
not for a new trial;
5) No genuine issue as to any material
fact is a ground for judgment
N.O.V. (i.e., borrowed from the
standard for summary judgment
under C.R.C.P. Rule 56);
6) Specific provision for conditional
motions for new trial are eliminated.
7) The time for filing all post-trial motions is fifteen days from the date
of judgment (including motion for
new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence, which previously
had a time limit of six months).
The purpose of the elimination of the
requirement of filing a motion for new
trial its a prerequisite of appeal is to
achieve judicial economy. Under the previous rule, such motions were required
presumably on the theory that they saved
appellate time since they ensured a trial
judge the opportunity to correct errors
before appeal. In practice, however, these
motions resulted in increased paperwork
and unnecessary delays. Trial judges
rarely reversed themselves, and even
when they did, any savings of time were

outweighed by the increased time required to hear and rule on many, often
perfunctory, motions.
In this respect, the Colorado rule has
now been brought into desirable conformity with the federal rule and should
present no problems in implementation.
In fact, the new rule removes a trap for
the unwary litigator. Under the previous
rule, an appellant was often deprived of
an important issue on appeal because
that issue did not become apparent until
after the time for filing a motion for new
trial had expired. In extreme cases, appellate rights were lost altogether.
The new rule's elimination of the requirement that a motion for directed verdict be made at the close of all the evidence as a prerequisite to a motion for
judgment N.O.V. is long overdue. The
fact that such a requirement ever existed
can be attributed to an over-zealous effort to adopt the federal version of
C.R.C.P. Rule 50 verbatim.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("F.R.C.P.") Rule 50 (motion for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict) was the product of a
long constitutional history related to the
right to jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment. F.R.C.P. Rule 50 was
drafted to conform with U.S. Supreme
Court cases which had held judgment
continued on page 1203
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N.O.V. to violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. However, directed verdicts had long been recognized
as a valid exercise of a judicial prerogative. It was only after the U.S. Supreme
Court finally permitted judgment N.O.V.
in the form of a reconsiderationof a prior
motion for directed verdict that F.R.C.P.
Rule 50 provided for judgment N.O.V.
To conform to constitutional history,
F.R.C.P. Rule 50 permitted judgment
N.O.V. only in the form of a reconsideration of a prior motion for directed verdict. Thus, if no prior motion for directed
verdict had been made, there could be no
reconsideration and, thus, no motion for
judgment N.O.V. It was this situation,
not logic, which compelled the requirement in the federal rule. There was little
reason for the requirement in the Colorado rule because the Seventh Amendment
had never been applied to the states via
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The primary effect of this often overlooked requirement in the old Colorado
rule was to deprive the unwary litigator of
a judgment N.O.V. Indeed, the only reason such deprivations were not more
common was the tendency of cautious
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counsel to make knee-jerk and sometimes perfunctory motions for directed
verdict based on the theory that there was
nothing to lose. In any case, the requirement of making prior motions for directed verdict mercifully has been repealed by new Rule 59. There should be
no problem implementing this change.
Judgment N.O.V.
The addition of the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence as a basis for judgment N.O.V. and its elimination as a
basis for a new trial will require court
interpretation before its impact can be
fully measured. Also, the application of
the summary judgment standard of "no
genuine issue of material fact" to judgment N.O.V. similarly will require court
interpretation.
Elimination of sufficiency of the evidence as a ground for new trial is certainly
a logical amendment. Indeed, it is difficult
to see how such a ground could ever have
been the basis for a new trial. If the evidence presented at trial was clearly insufficient, the party against whom the insufficient evidence was offered would be entitled to judgment, not just a new trial that
would merely provide the opponent with
an unmerited second bite at the apple. 2
Thus, if insufficiency of the evidence as a
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matter of law should be the basis for any
post-trial motions, logic dictates that the
motion be judgment N.O.V., not a motion for a new trial.
The problem is that there is a large body
of Colorado case law under old C.R.C.P.
Rule 50 defining the judgment N.O.V.
standard as a "reasonable man" standard. 3 Although the "sufficiency of the
evidence" language can be found in some
ofthe cases,' no case has been found under
the old rule incorporating the "no genuine
issue of material fact" standard. The "reasonable man" test clearly predominates in
the case law under old C.R.C.P. Rule 50.
One question arising under the new
rule is whether re-enacted Rule 50(e) supercedes the weight of case authority under old Rule 50. The sufficiency of evidence test may be merely a different way
of stating the reasonable man test: if the
evidence is such that no reasonable person could possibly find in favor of the
party against whom the motion is made,
then the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. Likewise, if there is no genuine
issue of material fact, by definition only
legal questions remain, and the case
should be decided by the court. Thus,
re-enacted Rule 50(e) arguably does not
supercede existing case law, but merely
codifies it.
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A second question is whether the standard forjudgment N.O.V. is still the same
as for directed verdict. Re-enacted Rule
59 eliminated the fiction that judgment
N.O.V. isbut a reconsideration of a prior
motion for directed verdict. Thus, it also
eliminated the theoretical relationship
between the two motions. Under the relationship that existed between the two
motions under old Rule 50, the standard
for the one was by definition the same as
for the other, since judgment N.O.V. was
but a reconsideration of the same motion
previously made (i.e., directed verdict).
New Rule 59 can be seen as eliminating
the fiction of reconsideration, but it does
not alter the equivalency of standards for
the two motions. Any other interpretation
would require rejection of the only existing body ofColorado case law interpreting
judgment N.O.V. and directed verdict.
Certainly, there is nothing in new Rule 59
generally, or 59(e) specifically, to suggest
such a result.
Changes in C.R.C.P. Rules 50 and 52
Amendments to C.R.C.P. Rules 50,52,
and 6 were made primarily to bring thepi
into conformity with re-enacted Rule 59.
For example, amended Rule 50, which
previously covered both directed verdict
and judgment N.O.V., now covers only
directed verdict. Judgment N.O.V. is covered exclusively by Rule 59. However, in
eliminating all references to judgment
N.O.V., amended Rule 50 also eliminated
all references to "conditional motions for
new trial."
Under old Rule 50 (taken verbatim
from the federal rule), potential trap for
the unwary litigator existed by virtue of a
U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting
F.R.C.P. 50. InNeely v. Ebys which arose
out of the U.S. District for Colorado, the
verdict winner failed to file a "conditional
motion for new trial in the eventjudgment
N.O.V. was reversed." 6 As a result, ajudgment entered in favor of the verdict loser
upon reversal of the trial judges' denial
of his motion for judgment N.O.V. was
upheld. The verdict winner's demand for
consideration of his belated request for a
new trial was rejected because ofhis failure
to file such a "conditional motion for new
trial."
A question arising under the amended
Colorado Rule 50 is the effect the elimination of the provision for a conditional
motion for new trial will have. Of course,
the elimination of the provision does not
mean such a motion cannot be made.
However, is such a motion necessary to
avoid the Neely predicament for the verdict winner? The answer is that the elimi-
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nation of the provision for conditional
motions also seems to eliminate the Neely
"penalty" for failure to make one
A Colorado appellate court should always consider a verdict winner's grounds
for a new trial upon reversal of the trial
judge's denial ofthe verdict loser's motion
forjudgment N.O.V. Although the courts
must interpret the new rule, in the meantime, the prudent verdict winner should
make a conditional motion for new trial
at the trial level, or at least in the first
appellate brief.
Provision for amendment of findings
has been deleted in amended C.R.C.P.
Rule 52, and is now covered in Rule 59.
In conformity with the spirit of amended
Rule 59, new Rule 52 makes it clear that
neither requests for findings nor objection to findings are necessary for purposes of review.

Changes in C.R.C.P. Rule 58
Amendments to Rule 58 (entry ofjudgment) are unrelated to the C.R.C.P. Rule
59 amendments. Prior to 1977, C.R.C.P.
Rule 58 closely followed F.R.C.P. Rule
58 for determining the date of entry of
judgment. This version of C.R.C.P. Rule
58 provided that the date of entry ofjudgment was the date thejudgment was noted
in the register of actions. In 1977, the rule
was changed to provide for a more complicated method of determining the date of
entry of judgment.
In a routine case, the effective date was
the date judgment was ordered in open
court or in chambers. However, where the
party or counsel was absent, notice of
judgment was to be mailed to counsel or
the party and was effective upon mailing.
In cases where counsel prepared a written
judgment, the effective date was the date
the written judgment was signed by the
judge. Ambiguities and questions abounded under the 1977 version of the rule.
The purpose ofthe 1985 amendment to
C.R.C.P. Rule 58 was to provide for a
certain date for the effective entry ofjudgment. Thus, the 1985 rule reverts to the
pre-1977 standard that "the effective date
of entry ofjudgment shall be the date the
judgment is entered in the register of actions." Unfortunately, the 1985 rule has
retained the old language, providing:
ifjudgment is entered under the provisions of this rule when counsel .., is not
present.... the clerk shall mail a written notice ofthe entry ofjudgment. . .to
counsel ofrecord. . .and the full time for
filing of a motion for post-trial relief or
an appeal shall commence to run from
the date of mailing.
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Under the old version of the rule, this
language was necessary to provide for
mailing where counsel was not present in
open court or in chambers. Under the
1985 version, however, this language is
superfluous and even confusing because
the effective date isto be determined in the
routine case by the date the judgment is
entered in the register of actions by the
clerk. It is not clear to what the following
language refers: "if ... judgment is entered under the provisions of this rule
when counsel. . . is not present." Counsel

would rarely, if ever, be present when the
clerk makes this entry in the register of
actions.
Thus, if the quoted language in fact
refers to this act by the clerk, the mailing
requirement would be triggered in virtually all cases, and the time for appeal and
filing post-trial motion would begin to run
from the date of mailing. This would be
true despite the clear language elsewhere
in the rule purporting to establish the date
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of entry in the judgment record as the
effective date of entry of judgment.

date the judgment is entered in the judgment record under amended Rule 58.
NOTES

Changes in C.A.R. Rule 4
To further complicate matters, amended C.A.R. Rule 4 states that a party must
file a notice of appeal within forty-five
days ofthe entry ofjudgment ifthe parties
are present "at the time such judgment is
announced" (emphasis added). This language seems inconsistent with amended
Rule 58, which eliminated the old language providing for entry ofjudgment on
the date of announcement ofjudgment in
open court or in chambers, substituting
the date the judgment is entered in the
register of actions.
Until these ambiguities are resolved,
the prudent litigator should assume that
the shorter oftwo possible periods applies:
the period beginning on the date the judgment is "announced" in accordance with
amended C.A.R. Rule 4 or, at least, the

1.C.R.C.P. Rule 103 is not discussed in this
article. Seethe rule and forms in 13 TheColorado Lawyer 2203 (Dec. 1984).
2. Absent, of course, a showing of newly
discovered evidence, in which case the newly
discovered evidence and not insufficiency of
the evidence is the proper grounds for the
motion for new trial.
3. Under this standard, a judgment N.O.V..
(and directed verdict) can be granted only ifthe
evidence is such that "reasonable men could

not from the evidence reach the same conclusion as did the jury." See, e.g., Slifer v. Wheller
and Lewis, 39 Colo.App. 269, 567 P.2d 388
(1977); Converse v. Zink, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.
1981); Romero v. Denver, 183 Colo. 32, 514
P.2d 626 (1973)(directed verdict).
4. See, e.g., Roberts v. Bucher,41 Colo.App.

138, 584 P.2d 97 (1978).
5. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
6. Id.
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